Smile! And your favorite charity benefits.

Recently, Amazon implemented a program called ‘Smile’ that allows you to select a charity who will get a small portion (0.5%) of your purchases. The beauty of this program is that you select your charity one time. Every visit to Amazon after that, they donate. Even better, if you forget to go to the ‘smile’ sub-domain, Amazon will usually remind you and give you a chance to one-click over.

When you consider that Amazon made $74.45 billion in revenue in 2013, this could potentially add up to serious money being donated to charities around the world. If 0.5% of all of their revenue in 2013 was donated, that would be $372,250,000. Yes, $372 million dollars. That is almost 2% of the estimated cost to end homelessness in the U.S. Not bad, that a single company has that capability and puts that power in the hands of their customers.

So click on smile.amazon.com once, choose your charity, and help contribute to your cause. Finally, spread the word. The more that opt in to this program, the more charities benefit.

BSidesLV, two boxes-of-shit up for charity auction…

For those not familiar, last year I created a new-and-improved Box-of-Shit that was put for charity auction at BSidesLV 2014. Wow, lot of dashes there, go Engrish! For those not familiar with the absolutely legendary attrition.org boxes-of-shit, take a minute to familiarize yourself with it. The box last year was the center of a heated bidding war, with a BSidesLV security staff member proxying bids from another room, as a bidder was also teaching a class or robbing a casino or something like that. Anyway, Nate the Hero (official title) donated $1,000 to the charities selected by BSides (EFF, Securing Change, and HFC). Outstanding!

This year, I doubled down. There are TWO boxes of shit up for auction…

First, the important part. I humbly ask that you read and focus on this bit, because it is the entire point of my effort and goal in doing this. BSidesLV 2015 auctions will raise money for OWASP, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Hackers for Charity (HFC), and Hak4Kidz. Supporting charity is always a good thing, right?

Remember, InfoSec is considered a “zero unemployment” industry, and our average salaries are ridiculous. While we are quick to do the Facebook “like-activism” to support minimum wage increases, many of us spend $6 on a coffee every morning. If you make solid money in our field, and you cannot go out of pocket for 1% of your salary, you should probably skip the next version of “h4ck1ng f0r l33t kidz” and read a book on personal finances. Live a little… give up a shred of luxury, and donate to the greater good. If you win, you will get to read some personal thoughts I have on the matter, and receive a challenge of sorts.

So… there are two boxes this year! You can troll my Twitter feed for a few random pictures that barely tease what are in each. Even better, you can use this blog to see the teaser page that is accompanied with each box! I’ve been told that there will be remote bidding this year, which is very cool. For the next two days, I will also answer questions about each box, in a manner that does not reveal how awesome, or how lame a box is. Rest assured, more time and energy was spent on these two boxes than all other boxes/envelopes I have ever sent out, combined. Each box comes with a ~ 4 page personal letter for the winner, among other things. That has to be worth a postage stamp at the least.

box-bad

box-good

Here you go! You get what the in-person bidders get, the same teaser PDF. If you are at keys, you can play 20 questions via Twitter, while they are throwing back a bud light and telling their new friends about how they found an unpatched WordPress CMS last week.

p.s. These are likely to be the last ever boxes I brew, for many reasons.
p.p.s. In the interest of exposure, I will spam this link several times the next couple of days. DEAL WITH IT

Twitter’s crowd-sourced blocking idea good, implementation bad…

Yesterday I saw a few mentions of Twitter’s new method for “crowd-sourcing” user blocks. The idea is that one person may have blocked dozens of trolls, and you want to do the same without having to dig through a lot of Tweets. I read about how it was implemented, sighed, and moved on. Last night, someone I respect for his technical prowess over the years said it was “well done”, and I disagreed. He said I should post a blog with my idea, so your wish is granted.

welldonetwitter

The Twitter blog that outlines the implementation says some users “need more sophisticated tools.” Sophisticated, not convoluted and annoying to implement. There is a big difference. From the blog:

To export or import a list of blocked accounts, navigate to your blocked accounts settings on twitter.com. Click on the advanced options drop-down menu and select the action you want to take.

To download a list of your blocked accounts, select the export option and confirm the accounts you want to export.

The blog doesn’t even explain the next part for some reason, and I am curious why. Could it because the process starts looking more hassle than benefit? The next step is to host that block list somewhere, advertise you did so, have another user download it, then they go to twitter.com, and imports the list. Fast and easy right? Of course not; that is one of the most convoluted methods of using this type of feature. Your average Twitter user, especially the huge percent that only use it via mobile, simply will not go through this process (and cannot easily do it if they wanted to). Even sitting at my computer, having to do actions outside my Twitter client is annoying and this has too many steps.

How about integrate the functionality instead? Every client has a way to look up a user, or interact with them.

block-context

Just about anywhere on this context menu works nicely. “Add/Inherit @AlecMuffet’s blocks…” or “Block @AlecMuffet’s blocks…” or “Share @AlecMuffet’s blocks…”. One click and a confirmation box, and I could take any of his exported blocks and make them my own. That presents a smoother, more easily crowd-sourced model that is the intent here. If I have multiple accounts, it is three clicks as I choose which account (or all accounts) to add blocks to. Compare that 2 or 3-click method, with the one Twitter came up with. Designing the “User Experience” (UX) is an art, and not many companies do it well. It is often due to the disconnect between how the developers use a product or service and how their users or customers use it.

John Thomas Draper: Setting the Record Straight

It is almost a ‘fact’ that John Draper, also known as Captain Crunch, discovered that a toy whistle in a box of cereal could be used to make free phone calls. I say ‘almost’ a fact, because so many people believe it, and so many people have written about it as if it were fact. Even recently, a magazine known for intelligent geeky facts parroted this falsehood:

Not long after Engressia shared this information with the other phreakers, John Draper discovered that a toy boatswain’s whistle that was included in boxes of Cap’n Crunch cereal in the late 1960s could blow a perfect 2600Hz tone.

Even going back to 1983, a book titled “Fighting Computer Crime” by Donn B. Parker carried the myth:

A young man just entering the U.S. Air Force to serve as a radio technician was fascinated with telephony and took courses on the subject at college and discovered the whistle that catapulted him to crime, infamy, and misfortune.

Google around for tales of Draper and the whistle will find a variety of sites that say he discovered it. These include the Snopes message board, a telephone tribute site, high school papers, and other archival sites. And this isn’t limited to more obscure sites, this ‘fact’ is still repeated by mainstream media articles.

While some in the industry have had doubts or heard tale that Draper did not discover the whistle’s significant tone, it wasn’t until last year that we finally got a definitive answer and story. Phil Lapsley wrote a book titled “Exploding the Phone” that gives an exhaustive history of phone phreaking and is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. Lapsley’s research put him in touch with many players of the time, and the real story emerged:

Page 155: Several years earlier a Los Angeles phone phreak named Sid Bernay had discovered you could generate a nice, clean 2,600 Hz tone simply by covering one of the holes in the plastic toy bosun whistle that was given away as a prize in boxes of Cap’n Crunch cereal. Armed with their Cap’n Crunch whistles Fettgather and Teresi and friends would cluster around pay phones at the airport and go nuts. [..] With Draper in the club the whistle trips expanded.

Page 166: (late summer of 1970) It was on one of those conference calls that John Draper discovered a new identity for himself. [..] One day Draper and Engressia were talking about using a Cap’n Crunch whistle to make their beloved 2,600 Hz tone, Engressia recalls, when Draper suddenly said, “You know, I think I’ll just call myself Captain Crunch. That’d be a good name.” Engressia immediately liked it. “It just fit him somehow,” he remembers. “It was just a good name for him. We called him ‘Captain’ a lot.” Captain Crunch was born.

Given that most of Draper’s modern reputation is based on his ‘discovery’ of the whistle, something he has done nothing to dispel or come clean about, I feel it is important to help set the record straight. While he may be an iconic figure in lore, even if undeserved, it is important to better understand what kind of person he was during this time.

Page 245: And as a rule universally agreed upon within their group, they avoided John Draper and his friends like the plague. “I tell you,” [David] Condon says, “Draper was the kiss of death. He was asking for it, he was looking for trouble.

Page 313: All this did not sit well with Steve Jobs and the other managers at Apple, who thought the Charley Board product was a bit too risky and, besides, they disliked Draper to begin with.

In addition to being disliked, Draper had a growing criminal record that included seven counts of violating 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by Wire, when he used a blue box to Australia, New York, and other places) in 1972, violating probation later in 1972, arrested in California in 1976, and indicted on three counts of 18 USC 1343 while on probation. To this day, Draper maintains it was a conspiracy:

Page 287: To this day, Draper maintains that he was framed. [..] “Well, it turns out that he had arranged with the FBI to tap that phone,” Draper says. “he told the FBI that I was going to be making a blue box call at that phone at that date and time.” The result was that the FBI now had a blue box call on tape with Draper’s voice on it. [..] You see, the informant that the Los Angeles office of the FBI sent up didn’t arrive in the Bay Area until Tuesday, February 24. The blue box telephone calls that Draper was eventually busted for occurred four days earlier, on Friday, February 20. And on that Friday the Los Angeles informant was still in Los Angeles, enjoying sunny southern California weather or breathing smog or whatever it is that LA phone phreak informants do when they’re off duty.

But this wasn’t the end of his crime. In New Jersey in 1977 he was arrested and charged with possession of a red box, which was later dropped. He was again arrested in 1977, this time in Pennsylvania, which led to him agreeing to a plea deal in 1978 to one count of possessing a device to steal telecom services. He was sentenced to 3 – 6 months in jail with credit for 1 month served. That charge and plea also meant he violated his federal probation for earlier crimes, sending him back to California to spend time in prison as well. During all of this time, two psychiatrists observed that Draper “tend[s] to pass himself off as the victim claiming that he has almost no control over all of the troubles that now beset him” and that he had “numerous paranoid delusions of being especially picked out for persecution because of his power and knowledge”. Both psychiatrists agreed that a jail would not be a good place for Draper, leading a judge to sentence him to a furlough program for one year. Finally, in 1987, he was caught forging tickets for the BART system which lead to a plea bargain, resulting in a misdemeanor.

I offer all of this up, courtesy of Exploding the Phone, as a reminder that many people in InfoSec consider him a hero of sorts, and feel that his history was beneficial to the world of phreaking. In reality, it was not. He was just another phreak at the time, did not discover the Cap’n Crunch whistle, was caught during his crimes several times, and then somehow became a telecom legend. To this day, Draper still tries to use his reputation to get handouts from the industry. If you want to support him, just be sure you understand who you are supporting, and why.

Anatomy of a NYT Piece on the Sony Hack and Attribution

There is a lot of back-and-forth over who hacked Sony Pictures Entertainment. For a not-so-brief summary, here is an extensive timeline to catch you up. I am going to drill down on a single point as it is both fascinating and disgusting. Using a single article that is heavily influencing people around the world, and helping to polarize the InfoSec community on who hacked Sony, I want to show you exactly what you are quoting and reading. Why? Because people don’t seem to be reading past the headline or first couple of paragraphs. What seems like a strong, definitive piece, falls apart and begins to contradict itself entirely halfway through the article. The New York Times piece in question is titled “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony“.

Consider what the headline says. First, it says that North Korea ordered the attack on Sony. Second, it says the U.S. has found out, meaning there is some body of evidence that led to that conclusion. Seems simple enough. But where does this come from?

American officials have concluded that North Korea was “centrally involved” …
Senior administration officials, who would not speak on the record …
Officials said it was not clear how the White House would respond.
Other administration officials said a direct confrontation with the North would provide North Korea with the kind of dispute it covets.

So how many officials are we talking about here? American officials? Senior administration officials? “Other” administration officials? Not a single one on record, which is very curious given named sources are the backbone of solid reporting. Are these officials part of the military? Law enforcement agency? Or just policy wonks that may or may not be getting briefed by someone with a clue?

The administration’s sudden urgency came after a new threat was delivered this week to desktop computers at Sony’s offices, warning that if “The Interview” was released on Dec. 25, “the world will be full of fear.”

Wait, so the Sony network is still entirely compromised weeks after it was publicly disclosed? That is an interesting angle, why haven’t we seen articles covering that? The company brought in to do forensics, are they losing this battle? Or did they mean the message was emailed to Sony employees, and the wording is confusing since the initial attack included actually replacing the desktop background on thousands of Sony desktops? Or was this a reference to the attackers posting that message on a public website (Pastebin)?

“Remember the 11th of September 2001,” it said. “We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at that time.”

This comes from the latest Pastebin post, since removed. I think that is the simple, logical explanation.

While intelligence officials have concluded that the cyberattack was both state-sponsored and far more destructive than any seen before on American soil, there are still differences of opinion over whether North Korea was aided by Sony insiders with knowledge of the company’s computer systems, senior administration officials said.

Wait a minute, the title is definitive, the U.S. says North Korea did it. Now even more unnamed officials say Sony insiders may have helped them? If you follow the whole “this is an act of war” nonsense, then any American Sony employee just committed treason, right? If it was a Japanese Sony employee, then Japan is in league with North Korea? I mean, we have to be careful on our rhetoric of war and blame, as these little comments can mean big things.

North Korea’s computer network has been notoriously difficult to infiltrate. But the National Security Agency began a major effort four years ago to penetrate the country’s computer operations, including its elite cyberteam, and to establish “implants” in the country’s networks that, like a radar system, would monitor the development of malware transmitted from the country.

So Newt Gingrich, Dave Aitel, and others are saying a North Korean attack on Japanese company Sony is an “act of war” against the U.S., but we openly admit that the U.S. government has been trying to penetrate North Korean computers for at least four years, and that isn’t an act of war? That doesn’t make sense. Either such intrusions are an act of war, or they aren’t. We can’t have this both ways.

It is hardly a foolproof system. Much of North Korea’s hacking is done from China. And while the attack on Sony used some commonly available cybertools, one intelligence official said, “this was of a sophistication that a year ago we would have said was beyond the North’s capabilities.”

So the definitive headline is now clouded by statements like these. We don’t know where the attacks originated, the tools were commonly available and had been seen in attacks years ago, but then the official says it is sophisticated? Not sure this ‘intelligence official’ has the same standards for the word ‘sophisticated’ as many in InfoSec.

But there is a long forensic trail involving the Sony hacking, several security researchers said. The attackers used readily available commercial tools to wipe data off Sony’s machines. They also borrowed tools and techniques that had been used in at least two previous attacks, one in Saudi Arabia two years ago — widely attributed to Iran — and another last year in South Korea aimed at banks and media companies.

Do we all know what a forensic trail is? This is a shaky list of circumstantial evidence at best. Given the use and history of the tools, making an assumption on who used it seems absurd.

But one of those servers, in Bolivia, had been used in limited cyberattacks on South Korean targets two years ago. That suggested that the same group or individuals might have been behind the Sony attack.

Again, do we not see how circumstantial this is? On one hand you claim the attackers are sophisticated, on the other you say they use a compromised computer for two years that would implicate them because of past attacks.

The Sony malware shares remarkable similarities with that used in attacks on South Korean banks and broadcasters last year. Those intrusions, which also destroyed data belonging to their victims, are believed to have been the work of a cybercriminal gang known as Dark Seoul. Some experts say they cannot rule out the possibility that the Sony attack was the work of a Dark Seoul copycat, the security researchers said.

Definitive headline, yet more doubt on who attacked Sony.

The Sony attack also borrowed a wiping tool from an attack two years ago at Saudi Aramco, the national oil company, where hackers wiped off data on 30,000 of the company’s computers, replacing it with an image of a burning American flag.

A public tool from two years ago, and this is influencing attribution? Investigators should be logical and skeptical. Actual evidence should be the guiding factor in their investigation and determining attribution.

Security experts were never able to track down those hackers, though United States officials have long said they believed the attacks emanated from Iran, using tools that are now on the black market.

So we couldn’t positively attribute the attack two years ago that used those tools, and now we want to use that tenuous link claiming it is some kind of ‘proof’ North Korea was involved? This makes no sense.

“It’s clear that they already had access to Sony’s network before the attack,” said Jaime Blasco, a researcher at AlienVault, a cybersecurity consulting firm.

I have given many a buzz-quote to the media, and I understand how they can be taken out of context. This is a great example. Blasco sounds like a total idiot, but I have a strong feeling he isn’t. What does this quote mean exactly? Getting access to Sony’s network requires an attack. Subsequent actions are part of that attack, or the fallout. Or does he mean “had access” in the context of a legitimate trusted employee? InfoSec people: be careful when giving buzz-quotes to journalists.

The cost of the assault was small: The attackers used readily available tools to steal data and then wipe it off Sony’s machines.

Once again, “readily available tools”, yet we are attributing this to a nation-state attack? Read between the lines and we have no real attribution at this point, at least not demonstrated by anyone. I doubt Mandiant is sharing their results with anyone publicly, leaving the rest of this to guess-work.

Representative Mike Rogers, the Michigan Republican who leads the House Intelligence Committee, said the hackers had “created a backdoor to Sony’s systems” that they repeatedly re-entered to send threatening messages to Sony employees.

Ya think? That is hacker 101 shit right there Mr. Rogers. Sophisticated malware to allow such access has been around for more than 30 years, and is trivial to get from thousands of web sites.

The North Koreans have half-denied involvement, but have left open the possibility that the attacks were the “righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers.”

Well played North Korea.

All in all, we have an article with a definitive title, “citing” between one and dozens of unnamed officials, that may be guessing like most of the world, giving as much “evidence” that it wasn’t necessarily North Korea, and it is whipping up a frenzy causing politicians and InfoSec professionals calling this war. I’ve said it for a week, and I must say it again. How about we wait for actual evidence. A public report outlining all of the forensics available, that can be peer-reviewed to some capacity, before we go rattling our saber at a country that may not be involved. Sure, North Korea is wonky on their statements implying it was them, then “half-denying” it, whatever that means (curious no one ever links to these statements, or are these more “unnamed officials” from their government?).

Remember, North Korea is the same country that threatened the U.S. with a nuclear missile earlier this year. They like to rattle their saber at everyone, but it doesn’t mean they actually did anything. Taking their implications or half-denials as fact isn’t prudent. I am not saying North Korea wasn’t involved. I am simply saying that this speculative circle-jerk is not helping anyone, and only serves to cause headache and grief. Level-heads must prevail. If you feel the need to comment on the matter, make sure you are educated about what has happened the last 30 days, and then try to be a voice of reason in this ugly mess.

e-MDs, Inc. Solution Series 7.2.1.634 Screen Lock Failure Information Disclosure

e-MDs, Inc. Solution Series integrated electronic health record and practice management software version 7.2.1.634 contains a flaw in the screen lock functionality. When a user locks the screen, under some circumstances, the screen will display the login box but fail to obscure any of the information displayed otherwise. As I discovered on March 21, 2014 at my doctor’s office, the screen not only displayed some of my information including name, account number, date of birth, phone number, and doctor notes, it also showed the same information for a second patient.

emds-solutions

BSidesLV, Charity, and a change of heart.

Read it all heathen! Teaser list of stuff in the charity box is included below.

As most reading this blog know, next week is the annual pilgrimage to Las Vegas to attend the ‘meta-con’. A mix of BSidesLV, BlackHat Briefings USA, DEFCON, and a number of other smaller sub-conferences, meet-ups, gatherings, and the ever present ‘hallway-con’. It is a week of chaos. Incredible opportunity always clashes with regrets, wishing you had checked out a talk, or met up with long-time friends, or run into new people you only know virtually. My first DEFCON was #2, twenty years ago, and it seems like both yesterday and a lifetime ago. I won’t go into a long analysis on how it is changed; just know it has changed drastically. Not saying for the better or worse either, because it is both.

Next week I am putting up an infamous attrition.org box-of-shit for charity at BSidesLV. I have done charity boxes at BSidesDEN in 2012 and 2014 that raised around $480 for the supported charities (usually EFF and/or HFC). Those were in addition to other charity auctions via eBay to support the Open Security Foundation, EFF, and the Concoctory.

You may notice a trend here. The last few years, I have made a big change to help support charities/NFP a lot more than I did before, including volunteering time as I can. Next week I will be working the registration desk at BSidesLV, and working as a volunteer for the Skytalks at DEFCON. Unrelated to security, I donate a fair amount of money and/or time to animal-related charities around the Denver area. I support a variety of humanitarian efforts to support research to cure ailments, fight hunger, and more.

Now, I want to do more, and I want more security professionals to do the same. As an industry, we make a ridiculous amount of money providing security services. As an industry, we fail miserably at doing so. Sure, we have our individual wins here and there chasing contracts. But as a whole? Digital security is at an all-time low. There is more computer crime, more breaches, published vulnerabilities are not dropping despite incentive not to disclose (if you even quote CVE and a ‘drop’ to me, get out of my industry), and a more fundamental lack of trust in anything related to computers. If we’re making stupid money providing inferior services while towing a favorable line, we need to look inward and re-examine our lives. It simply isn’t ethical to reap the rewards on the back of false promises. As an industry, we need to strive to do better (and we have proven we can’t), or start to give back to more worthwhile efforts.

I encourage you to consider this seriously. Look at how you can give back to the community in more ways than you are currently doing. Figure out more causes that could benefit from your time or financial support. Break away from the corporate high-dollar conferences run by non-security companies and support the home-grown community-driven conferences. Keep that in mind and bid generously on my two auctions.


box-teaser

Next week at BSidesLV, on Tuesday and Wednesday, you can participate in the silent charity auction and bid on this box-of-shit. Unlike previous boxes, I have worked to ensure this one is different, more interesting, and more valuable (which is subjective, I know). First, it has a limited edition attrition.org DEFCON 22 badge in the box. Only five were made this year! One is up for auction by itself right now, and it sets the stage for the box. Next, there is a hand-knit Lazlo hat made by J. Renee Worsing that comes with care instructions. Not only is the badge made by Make It Urz, there is an engraved Lazlo lapel pin in the box.

If you win this box, you are fully encouraged to embrace that badge. Walk around all of the conferences telling wild tales of your work with attrition.org. Spin stories about the other staff members, what you have endured, what para-military ops you have done on our behalf. This badge gives you creative license to social engineer anyone and everyone you meet. Flash that badge and you have a 0.3% chance of walking into any other party. Flash that badge at the 303 party and I will personally escort you in, even if the party isn’t open to the masses yet. Find me in a random bar, I will buy you a drink or three. ALL WEEK.

That is the tip of the iceberg! In addition to those fine items, the following is contained in the box. And yes, my wording is carefully chosen to keep you guessing, while being entirely accurate at the same time.

  • Collectible currency from 8 different countries.
  • A military challenge coin.
  • Certified piece of history circa 1989.
  • Original ‘FREE KEVIN’ bumper sticker.
  • Attrition.org bracelets.
  • A gift card. For a store, some amount more than a dollar.
  • DEFCOn 21 speaker badge.
  • Lockpicks.
  • A “pocket full of fun”. Make of that what you will.
  • Cold, hard cash.
  • Stickers, items from a jail, and “sparkle power”.

All of that is in addition to the usual box-of-shit stuff that is more questionable in value. This box was designed for fun, for you to enjoy as you open it up and dig through the contents. Nikita contributed a lot of the material found in this box, so you should buy her a booze next week. Not so much for the box, more for the amount of time, effort, and anguish she puts into making DEFCON happen. It isn’t entirely the ‘Jeff show’.

Remember that your money is going to worthwhile charities that help other people. None of this money goes to me. It will go to a fund that is divided up to support EFF, HFC, and Securing Change.

20140802_164721

Samsung Galaxy Phones Factory Reset Persistent Local Information Disclosure

A couple years back, I handed my Samsung Galaxy S1 down to a friend. When she got it she browsed the file system out of curiosity and noticed that it had retained private information; both from applications, as well as content I generated (e.g. pictures). While she promised to do a write-up of all the information left behind, she never did (flake!). This is obviously a problem for those who reset their phone thinking it is truly wiped clean, and then hand it off to a friend, sell it, or trade it in for credit.

The other day, a relative and I both upgraded our phones. Him from a Galaxy S2 to a S5, and me from a Galaxy S3 to a S5. So I figured why not check both out to see if they did the same. Cliff notes: The Samsung Galaxy S2 (model SGH-T989) ‘factory reset’ leaves a lot of personal information behind, while the Samsung Galaxy S3 (model SGH-T999) does not. It certainly does not delete your content.

Here is what I found left behind on the Galaxy S2. Directories for installed applications that did not get deleted, or deleted entirely:
\CamScanner
\foursquare
\gameloft
\Intsig
\Lazylist
\telenav
\data\flixster
\convertpad

files:
\telenav70\sdlogs\4\22\2014042208.txt
\telenav70\sdlogs\5\23\2014052320.txt
\Photo Editor\2014-03-30 19.11.22.jpg
(personal picture)
\lookout\log.txt
\Intsig\CamScanner\.log\log-2013-12-25_21-59-09.log
\DCIM\Camera
(55 personal pictures)
\contactBackup\contacts.csv
\contactBackup\contacts.pdf
(both contain full list of contacts: name and phone #. this is from an app that backed up contact info)
\Android\data\com.zynga.words\cache\FBImages
(three images, FB avatar pics of players)
\Android\data\com.facebook.katana\cache\.facebook_-372648771.jpg
(private image from FB)
\tmp_fsquare.jpg
\tmp_fsq
(a PNG thumbnail of avatar selected for the app)
tmp_fsquare

The Galaxy S3 (model SGH-T999) that I used pretty heavily, was much better after factory reset. I found the following left behind:

\Phone\Application\SMemo
(didn’t use this app despite installing it. files suggests private info may be available after reset)

All pictures, contact info, and information from applications is gone. So from the Galaxy S1 to the Galaxy S3, Samsung figured out the ‘Factory Wipe’ finally.

Screenshot_2014-07-03-20-26-56

Why I Love and Hate Presenting at Security Cons

Hate

I am not really a public speaker. I am nervous when I speak, even on topics I am very familiar with. Part of that is because I hold myself to a high standard for accuracy and ‘no bullshit’ given my history of calling others out on it. Just like I was right to do it to them, anyone in the audience is right to do it to me. My most recent talk has a ‘rule’ at the start that questions can wait until then end, but if I make a mistake speak up immediately. If you are right, I will correct it, apologize, and give you credit for holding me to such standards. If you are wrong, I will mock you. Seems fair! I hate dealing with AV, I don’t like dealing with cons and logistics and setup. This is partially due to past incidents where I am a registered speaker on schedule, and have to spend 15 minutes convincing the staff I am actually a speaker and have been attending that con for a decade just to get a badge (e.g. BlackHat). Every con does a different setup, where you aren’t sure if the speaker laptop will be ‘extending the monitor’ or ‘duplicating the monitor’. This matters for those of us using ‘presenter view’ in PowerPoint. I must have my speaker notes available in most talks as I tend to include dates, numbers, and details that I can’t otherwise remember.

Love

I also love presenting, because when I opt to do so, it is fairly interesting research or perspective. My talks are not technical, they won’t help you exploit a kernel or bypass memory protection. Instead, they are more in line with a historical and unique perspective in some cases (e.g. Anonymous, Cyberwar), or specialized to something I have focused on for two decades (vulnerability databases and related matters like statistics). I fully understand that some of my topics are not for everyone. Hell, they aren’t for most of the industry as far as a talk. While they likely use a vulnerability database, they certainly aren’t interested in the minutiae that goes with it. That doesn’t really matter to me. I’d rather have 20 people truly interested in the talk listening, rather than a ‘standing room only’ situation despite half the room not knowing the material past the first slide. For those handfuls of people out there, I know my presentations are improving on the common body of knowledge.

Hate, with a Twist

My most recent presentation, 112 years of vulnerabilities, has led me to develop a new kind of hate of presenting. The first time I gave the talk was in 2013 at BSidesDE. After the talk, I gave it twice more; once at a community college as a favor to a friend, and at a small boutique conference at a business school of a college. In doing the talk there, the conference organizer and a professor offered to try to get a copy of the ‘Repaired Security Bugs in Multics’ from 1973. What seemed like an impossible-to-find book ended up being a 7 page paper. But she managed to get a copy via inter-library request as a professor. With that simple gesture, the vulnerabilities in Multics I had cataloged jumped from 10 to 16. Thanks A.M.!

Six months later I get to spend some of my little free time going through more historic papers and find another dealing with Multics. Not only do I find more context around material in that presentation, I find that it is actually a lot more detailed and fascinating. The incident I describe actually happened twice, once in 1979 as I outline, and years before in 1974 with different results. The time spent digging into that came shortly after giving the talk to a security company on the east coast by request. Shortly after giving the talk, which extended to two hours with additional detail, Q&A, and a mix of discussion with them, I was approached about the electro-mechanical rotor cipher machines discussed. We got to talking for half an hour where he gave me pointers and information to later research. Before I left that day, he gave me two books on military cryptoanalysis from 1956 that were previously classified. Yep, just laying on his shelf, he had two tomes of incredible knowledge that might help me in cataloging the history of vulnerabilities. I’ve only had an hour or two to go through them so far. While I determined the first book had no usable information, the second is a treasure trove. A single appendix of that book appears to have information that will double the vulnerability entries I have on such machines and the compromise of their crypto systems. Thanks J.M.!

Every time I find such information, it makes me regret giving the talk. While the talks were given to show perspective and it was clear the history was incomplete, I hate that my audiences didn’t get all of the information. Doesn’t matter that I didn’t have the information originally, I feel that I should have taken more time to research all of this better. I’m both afraid and excited that every time I give this talk, someone else will come forward with a wealth of new knowledge. It is an absolute delight for the vulnerability historian in me, but an absolute dread for someone who can’t stand delivering less than a complete talk.

Moving Forward

Since the first time I delivered the talk, I have had several people tell me I should write a book on the vulnerability history I outline. There is certainly an abundance of material there, and boiling it down to a 45 minute talk has caused me to deliver the talk at a faster pace each time. Part of me wants to write such a book, and release it as a free e-book to the community. It would be fun doing so. On the other hand, it would also take months of dedicated research to finish a true preliminary overview of such history and time is a valuable commodity to say the least.

So to my previous attendees, I apologize. I certainly hope you enjoyed the talk, but I really hope you understand that this is work in progress. Work that I have been doing for a long time, and will continue to do. At some point, if I come up with a more complete work, I hope to be able to share all of it with you in some fashion.

You have a new security initiative? Great, here’s some advice…

I am getting frustrated with the never-ending stream of ‘new’ security initiatives being announced. Doesn’t matter if they are community driven, compliance-based, or ‘industry standards’. For twenty years, we’ve heard it over and over, yet things just aren’t changing.

Most of these initiatives flop. Some may make it months or even years, limping along with virtually no support. Even projects with hundreds of people involved or supporting represent such a tiny fraction on the InfoSec industry, let alone the general IT industry, to say nothing of the rest of the world. In a few cases, the ‘new’ idea might even make a slight improvement for 0.000001% of the world. At best…

Largely though, they are worthless. People sometimes even spend more time banging on the initiative war-drum than the end result. Worse, for every one announced that does any real and lasting good, another hundred end up wasting time and going nowhere.

So you want to announce a new initiative to save the world? Great! How about instead, skip the initiative name, the policy, the name, the graphics, and the rest of the things that take time from actually doing something. Don’t talk about the project day in and day out. Just do good.

If you really feel that a structured movement with lofty ambitions and a brand are required, then do good first. Show the world you are serious and capable. Announce your new initiative on the back of a big ‘win’ or change. That will demonstrate you have the drive and dedication. Come out of the gate on the back of something concrete, not fluffy bullet points that are indistinguishable from any for-profit security company or charlatan.

Yes, everyone knows you want to ‘help’ and ‘protect’ and ‘improve’ and ‘secure’. The exact same thing everyone else in the industry says, both good and bad. And like many of them, your new initiative may not deliver either.