A View Into DEF CON 25 CFP…

First, this post is not sanctioned by DEF CON in any way. I am a member of the CFP team who decided to keep some rudimentary statistics on the submissions this year. I did this to give the team a feel for just how many submissions we got, how many talks we accepted, and primarily to track the way we voted. This greatly assists the powers that be (the amazing Nikita) to more quickly determine which talks are well-received. Every day that I kept up on the spreadsheet, the more ideas I had on tracking. Other team members said “you should track…”, and I typically did. So this blog is to give some insight into the entire CFP process, with a solid slant on statistics about the submissions.

First, a few basics:

  • DEF CON 25 CFP opened on February 01, 2017
  • DEF CON 25 CFP closed on May 01, 2017
  • 17 talks were submitted after closing date and were considered for various reasons
  • We received 536 submissions
  • Three of the submissions were retracted by the end of CFP
  • BlackHat received 1,007 submissions this year for comparison

Next, who are we? There were technically 31 DC CFP reviewers this year, and you can read their fun profiles now (mouse over stuff here and there, call it an Easter egg)! Ten of them are considered ‘specialty reviewers’, where they typically review talks on a very specific topic such as ‘social engineering’ or ‘legal’. These are generally topics where the submissions are either too numerous and potentially murky to figure out if they are worth accepting (social engineering), or a topic that most of InfoSec aren’t really experts on, even when some of us are the #1 armchair lawyer in InfoSec. The specialty reviewers are expected to review their topic only usually, while a few are open to review multiple topics. That means there are 21 reviewers who are expected to review ‘as many talks as you can’, understanding that we may DEFER on a given submission if we feel it is out of our wheelhouse, and remembering that this is extremely time-consuming and we all have day jobs. Some of us have night jobs, and some of us have social lives (not me).

Every year we come up short on reviewers who are truly qualified to give solid feedback on a given topic. This year DC CFP put out a call for more volunteers and we hit a bit of gold, getting several new reviewers who are quality and put in a crazy amount of time. Next year? We know there are topics we need help on, so if you are sharp, kind of special(ty), or the top of your game in a popular field… come join us. I can’t stress how important this is. Instead of just working on a talk or doing a thing, you have the ability to help influence the presentations given at a conference with some 20,000+ attendees. That is a lot of power, a lot of influence, and the potential to do a lot of good. Personally, that is why I still sacrifice the incredible time I do.

Shout outs! The only way to start this paragraph is to call out Nikita for handling almost all CFP submission related emails. Incoming submissions, replies saying “you didn’t follow directions”, second-attempts, replies saying “no really you ‘brilliant hacker’, you didn’t read our guidelines”, posting them to the CFP platform, watching for the CFP team to say “I have questions” and us largely forgetting to flag it back to her, her following-up with the submitter, repeating several times in some cases, posting their replies, looking for the CFP team to ask more questions… hopefully you get the picture. The amount of work she fields in a three-month span, just related to CFP, is insane. I say that as someone who has worked more than 80 hours a week in this industry for the last twenty years. Oh, did I mention that she also voted on 60% of the talks? While five ‘full’ reviewers voted on less talks than her.

A plea! If you didn’t see the numerous Tweets and requests to get your talks in early, I cannot emphasize how much it benefits you, more than us. When a talk comes in during the first few weeks, it gives us plenty of time to not only review and ask questions, but to give feedback in the way of suggestions. In some cases, one of the team will break away from the board and work with the submitter to improve their submission. This year, I did that once with someone who’s original two submissions garnered a single yes vote. After working with them and giving feedback on how to combine the talks and hone in on the areas of interest, the re-submission received 12 yes votes and zero no votes. In an ideal world, that would happen for every submission, but a significant number of talks are submitted the last two days.

Meaningless numbers! Because our industry loves to work with statistics that they don’t fully understand or have little meaning without serious caveat and disclaimer (PPT), let me throw out a few. For the 536 submissions we received, the CFP team voted yes 1,223 times, no 3,555 times, maybe 186 times, deferred 945 times, and abstained 54 times. Again, we defer if we feel that a topic is not one we can fairly judge based on our expertise and rely on the rest of the team to review. We abstain when there is a potential conflict of interest: if we work with the submitter, we contributed to the submission, or have a negative personal past with the submitter.

Meaningful numbers! We requested feedback from the submitter 125 times and changed our votes 61 times. Working with us to answer our questions, willingness to accept our feedback, and work with us to build a better presentation benefits everyone. As Nikita tweeted, more than 60 of the accepted talks were from first-time DEF CON speakers. Given there were ~ 110 accepted talks (and 422 rejected), that is quite a lot. It is encouraging to see this many new speakers given some of the past submissions from egotistical industry veterans that felt they deserved a speaking slot on the back of a weak submission, simply because of “do you know who I am?!”

More meaningful numbers! Of the 536 submissions, 185 (34.77%) said they would release a new tool. Only 56 (10.53%) of those submissions said they would release a new exploit, and some of those claims were questionable. It is common for people submitting to DEF CON to also submit to BlackHat and/or BSidesLV. This year, 218 (40.98%) of those submissions were also submitted to BlackHat and 65 (12.22%) of them were also submitted to BSidesLV. For various reasons, often around the ability to get to Las Vegas, some submitting to BlackHat will submit to DEF CON but say that acceptable at DEF CON is contingent upon acceptance at BlackHat. This year, 36 (6.77%) talks were submitted to us with that caveat. In a somewhat arbitrary categorization, overall I felt that 200 (37.31%) of the talks were ‘red’ (offensive), 88 (16.41%) were ‘blue’ (defensive), and 38 (7.09%) were ‘black’. By ‘black’, I mean that the topic really had little merit or benefit for red-teaming and were really in the realm of criminals.

Even more meaningful numbers! Some of the most basic stats that can be generated for your ocular pleasure. First, these are arbitrary categories that were developed as we received submissions. Nothing formal and some talks were hard to classify:

From there, I broke it down further by some topics that aren’t necessarily specific to the red or blue domain. Again, kind of arbitrary and based on seeing the submissions as they came in and note that one talk may have been flagged as more than one topic:

When building a schedule over four days and across five tracks, while considering if it is better to suggest a talk for a village or alternative venue (e.g. Skytalks), Nikita has to play Tetris of sorts based on the accepted talks, the requested time, and the schedule. This is what she had to work with:

One of the more popular questions this year after an increased awareness and public discussion around diversity in InfoSec, is the gender breakdown for submissions:

Finally, a general picture of the submissions by month. Recall what it looked like for the April breakdown above and you once again get a good idea why we would like more submissions earlier in the process:

Finally, a quick note on a common perception for InfoSec conferences and talks in general. Given the drastic rise in the number of conferences popping up, there is a saturation that demands more submissions to fill the schedules. That means that veteran speakers can typically shop their talks around or be selective in where they submit based on the venue they find appealing. That also means more new speakers are submitting which results in a wide range of topic and quality of submissions. That led me to argue this Tweet and remind people that a conference can only work with what is submitted. Personally, I feel that the overall quality of submissions to DEF CON (and a couple other conferences I review for) have gone down this year and last. That means that DEF CON ended up accepting some talks that I personally did not care for.

Bottom line? If you are researching a cool topic, submit a talk on it. Have a unique perspective or done more digging on something? Share your work. Never submitted before? Submit early and let us work with you if you need it. If a security conference is lacking, it is due to the community as much as anything else.

A Note on the RSA Keynote Fiasco…

In the past day or two, The RSA Conference announced a few of the keynotes for the upcoming 2016 RSAC conference. The industry is largely scoffing at some of their choices, for obvious reasons. There are so many facets to this topic, one could write a book. Hopefully I will limit myself to the key points, as applies to the chatter in our industry. If a couple paragraphs are meh to you, skip down a few, as the point will likely change quite a bit.

First, let’s put this into perspective. This is the RSA conference. The Computer Dealers’ Exhibition (COMDEX) of the InfoSec industry. This conference is a weird mix of “OMG necessary” and “OMG I hate it“, and it has been for a decade or more. It’s the party everyone shows up to, and the one you want to be at, to ‘be seen’ and ‘catch up on the gossip’, even though you hate it. In our industry, it is the embodiment of reality T.V. in many ways. On the flip side, this conference hasn’t actually been relevant to our industry for a long time, where reality T.V. is sadly relevant in the worst ways. Sure, it is THE place to do a meet-and-greet, solicit new customers, solicit new employees, and show off your stupid “advances” in security technology. Advances in quotes for a blindingly obvious reason. But, if you feel RSAC is relevant in any meaningful way to our industry, you can stop reading here. You are not my intended audience, and do not meet the “you must have this IQ to ride this ride” criteria. Sorry =( I feel this point is almost entirely lost on the 2016 RSA keynote fiasco.

On the “keynote” angle, first… what is a “keynote” talk? You can’t even Google “keynote” and get the definition in the first few results. You actually have to qualify “keynote definition” which I can’t recall ever having to do for Google to get a definition. Even for some pretty obscure animal-related searches I have done while trying to learn as much about wildlife rehabilitation as I could. That is telling.

Now, I called this bit out in my BSidesDC “keynote” presentation in 2014, where I questioned what a keynote was, in my keynote. How very “meta”, and how very appropriate given I picked on RSAC back then. Look to slide 5 where I pointed out that RSAC had as many as four keynotes a day back then, 16 in total. So again… what is a keynote? For most conferences, it is very clear, per the definition. It “sets the intended tone of the conference” in so many words. For RSAC? It is more a game of how many “big” speakers can we cram into a multi-day event to fill the seats. [Remember, many of them may be in our industry, but it doesn’t mean they bring any value to the rest of us.]

This latest fiasco is no different. So… back to the controversy. RSA stacked the keynote deck with the usual nobodies (in the context of providing real value to our industry, or if an awesome person, not in the context of a 40 minute talk). This year, they went above and beyond, and are having three people in the keynote lineup that are more than questionable. I’m sure it isn’t the first time we have seen it, but it sticks in my mind… RSAC set up a “keynote panel”. For most conferences, that would be laughable, but in 2014 they had 16 keynotes. Compare that to this year, with 20 keynotes on the schedule so far! Two minorities, and one female, if you are keeping track after the last two years of our industry pointing out the lack of diversity. Maybe RSA will say it is a good sample representation to be politically correct, given the representation in the industry!! So… the three speakers making waves, well before the conference starts?

  • Charley Koontz, Actor, CSI: Cyber Panel
  • Shad Moss, Actor, CSI: Cyber Panel
  • Anthony E. Zuiker, Creator/Executive Producer of the CSI Franchise, Technology Visionary

It is honestly difficult to figure out how to approach this, in the sense of writing this blog. This show has been lambasted from day one within the InfoSec industry. Worse, it has deviated from the CSI franchise in ways that are arguably more harmful to the public than the predecessors. The last 15 years of the other CSI shows have created the “CSI Effect“, which has been a burden on our current legal system. It took many years of the original CSI franchise to give us that modern problem, that interferes with our judicial system on a daily basis. We are all arm-chair experts on DNA, trace matter, footprints, dark crime scenes, and flashlights. That is a T.V. show born out of a 30+ year scientific discipline. And it has serious backlash in the real world.

Now, we have CSI: Cyber, which is easily argued to be the worst of the franchise. Looking at ‘Rotten Tomatoes‘, well-known for providing real-world reviews of movies, what do they say about the entire CSI franchise?

rotten-tomatoes-csi

Wow… enough people hated CSI: Cyber to contribute their opinion, where the original CSI show that ran 15 years didn’t get enough feedback to rate. The original show was ground-breaking, in many ways. It introduced the average American household to the world of forensics, even if exaggerated and dramatized to some degree. Jump to today, and enough have spoken out against the new spinoff to give it a negative rating. That is telling.

OK OK, so jump back a bit, because this is not an easy blog to write. The entire CSI franchise is questionable; it has some serious value, but also has some serious pitfalls. So let’s try to focus on CSI: Cyber. Start by doing a Google search:

google-csi-cyber2

Woops, that is telling. It also reminds me that the series got renewed for season 2, which I bet would happen to an FBI agent I know (who refuses to watch the show, as does the entire ‘Cyber’ division in his city). If it gets renewed for season 3, I lose a dollar. OK, seriously sidetracked. Back to the latest drama..

Cliff notes: three people related to CSI: Cyber are part of the RSAC 2016 keynote clustermess this year. Two actors, and an executive producer putting himself forward as much more than that (or RSAC is), are part of a panel that is a keynote. Every bit of the InfoSec fiber is not happy with this, and they shouldn’t be. RSAC is grabbing what is popular, what is in the ‘mainstream’, and vomiting it on stage. No care, no concern, and most importantly, no consideration of what it means. Of the two actors, do either have any background in computers? Security? One is a very young rapper-turned-actor who I previously Tweeted to, because I felt his portrayal as an African American actor in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement was absolutely horrible. I’m a privileged white guy and I felt that episode was a disgrace to African Americans (do the math). The other is “sympathetic to the issues” according to Violet Blue, in an article she wrote on this topic. If Koontz is truly sympathetic, he should either back out of the talk accompanied by a public statement, or use the stage-time to go against the very reason he was invited. Embrace the fact he is a T.V. actor, that the show is lacking in technical detail or reality, and call out the technical advisors and/or producers, and let the world know why the show may be harmful. As for the producer, why? It could be argued there is value if one of the technical consultants to the show were to speak, not a producer.

It should be obvious that I do not think any of them are relevant, or should be keynoting a BSides, let alone RSAC. They are actors in a mid-ratings show, built on a 15 year-old franchise. A current iteration that isn’t really that popular or well-known… merely “what some people are watching”. RSAC is quite simply cashing in on a popular meme, in line with the profitable business.

So… let’s agree to agree, or agree to disagree! Yep, how is that for a blog plot twist, befitting that horrible T.V. show? Let’s focus on the small bit that actually got my attention in all this, that demanded all of the above as backstory and explanation. Let’s jump to the other fun bit of this mess. While most of the industry was somewhere between annoyed and outraged over these keynotes being announced, others quipped in ways that suggested the industry wouldn’t be so upset if it was “other” high-profile media-centric personalities that were keynoting.

rsac-fiasco-actors_from_hackers

I’d like to assume the ellipses were leading off to the obvious conclusion, “we would ridicule them just the same“. But I have a feeling that was not the intended argument. That movie is 20 years old, released on the fourth year of RSAC. Assuming you at least meant to compare the cast being keynotes at the 1995 RSAC… this is actually a more compelling comparison as far as a “timely” media publication being thrust upon our industry. Back then, I don’t think it would have been considered. I say that because some of us in the hacker circles back then joked about them speaking at DEFCON and how absurd it would have been.

rsac-fiasco-colbert_baldwin

This is a fascinating comment, because it puts two polar opposites as a single argument that somehow has the same merit, which is baffling to say the least (compare Colbert vs Baldwin in the context of ‘actor’ vs ‘comedian’). If your argument for comparison is “Stephen Colbert” (soft T), then I would argue you are beyond dense and completely oblivious to the genius of the persona Colbert (hard T) took on. The entire persona was designed around being a blind fanboy to an ‘industry’ (or political party in his case, which is basically an industry) in a manner that highlights how absurd the industry is in the first place. That is exactly the kind of persona that would help our industry realize how perverse it is, and show us through delicious irony how absurd and blind we are to our own problems. More importantly, Colbert did not claim any relevance to, or portray anyone in our industry in any way.

If your argument for comparison is Alec Baldwin? That is a valid argument I think! If the industry didn’t speak out against Baldwin in this context, while speaking out against CSI: Cyber actors, that seems hypocritical. I don’t recall Baldwin doing a RSAC keynote in the past, but it isn’t something I would have noticed unless there was an eruption of drama. Stick with this example for arguments against the CSI: Cyber cast.

rsac-fiasco-adam_savage

Really? This has to be the worst comparison possible. Adam Savage has made his career around breaking and building things, a cornerstone of the hacker ethos and mentality. Not only does he build and break things, he does it in the pursuit of truth and shares it with anyone willing to watch MythBusters. That embodies the hacker spirit in the minds of a significant portion of our industry. The cross-over from our largely digital world, to his largely analog world, makes complete sense. He is a rare case where the ‘reality’ in ‘Reality TV’ is actually true.

To come full circle, people still argue that RSAC has value because that is where the “trends” are announced. The problem is, RSA ‘trends’ are mostly buzzword rebrands of old technology, with a few ‘bleeding-edge’ adjectives thrown in to make them sound more sexy. I’ll leave this great Tweet as a tongue-in-cheek, but accurate, reminder of how a significant portion of our industry views the conference, regardless of keynote choices.

rsac-tic

Studies, articles, and social media activism are just a start.

I would imagine everyone reading this, who partakes of social media to any degree, is getting worn down with the social media activists. Like everything, there are some that are effecting change and doing great work. They use the media to spread the message while helping to enact change in other ways. Basically, doing more than just ‘awareness‘. You can Tweet and Facebook and Tumblr all day long about “help our vets”, and the sentiment is great. But until you turn that effort toward people who can effect change (e.g. politicians), it’s not likely to actually help a veteran. Oh, and you do occasionally promote charities that help the veterans and donate yourself… right?

Yesterday, “Spouse-gate” happened at the ASIS / ISC2 Congress event. In a nutshell, a female InfoSec professional is a speaker at the conference, and her InfoSec professional husband joined her as a regular attendee, but via her “plus one” that the conference provides for. Each “plus one” in the eyes of ISC2 is the spouse, which by definition is the husband or wife. So imagine his surprise when he goes to the registration desk and finds the staff “utterly confused how [he] could be a spouse and asks [him] four times how [he’s] a spouse“. Did the meaning of spouse change sufficiently in the past years, that it is only applied to females? He explains several times that his wife is speaking, and he is her “plus one”, and they finally understand. Next, they give him a con swag bag and information regarding ‘spouse events’ which include shopping trips. The bag included two bottles of hand lotion, an empty photo album, shopping coupons, a magazine, and the business card for Jay Claxton, the Director of Loss Prevention at Marriott Vacation Club International.

I think it safe to say that the conference bag for spouses is a clear case of misogyny. Now, why am I posting about this? Peruse the bag contents and scroll down…

isc2-bag

I have been an outspoken critic of ISC2 for many years. In the last couple of years, I have toned down that criticism considerably, for various reasons. The biggest reason is that one of the board members, Wim Remes reached out to me and prompted many discussions over a year. He made an effort to get my feedback on how ISC2 could improve in their process, public perception, and get back on track (my words) with their intended purpose of making the security industry better. When someone in a position to effect change reaches out and demonstrates they want to make things better, it is time to help them rather than continue to criticize the organization. In that time, Wim has done an incredible job working to change the organization from the inside. Sorry for the diversion, but I feel it is important to give credit to those working very hard toward bettering our industry.

At some point in the last year or two, ISC2 has taken on a very public “pro-woman” stance (scroll through their Twitter feed). They have collectively called for more equality in the workforce in our industry. In fact, within one hour of ‘Spouse-gate’ starting, ISC2 was Tweeting about women remaining underrepresented in InfoSec. It’s hard to understand how an organization can promote a great cause while also devolving to the base levels of misogyny that are a root cause of the inequality.

isc2-tweet

Social media activism can do great things. But many of the great things that can be done get lost in the noise of people blindly re-posting feel-good messages that ultimately do very little to do actual good, and concretely support the cause. If organizations like ISC2 want to help effect real change, they need to “be the change that [they] wish to see in the world.” In short, more doing and less grandstanding.

Compassion Fatigue in an industry largely devoid of compassion.

A few days ago, Bruce Schneier actually wrote a slightly interesting piece for Fusion. I say that with surprise because most of his articles are engaging and well-written, but he rarely shares new ideas or concepts. Most of my professional circle is already very familiar with a given topic, and Schneier largely enjoys a reputation for his insight because he has a considerable following and they read about it there first. In this case, it wasn’t so much that Schneier’s piece was new information (he did quote and cite a 1989 reference on the topic that was new to me), it was that he flirted with a much more interesting topic that is somewhat aligned with his point.

In ‘Living in Code Yellow’, Schneier quotes a handgun expert who described a specific mind-set. From his article:

In 1989, handgun expert Jeff Cooper invented something called the Color Code to describe what he called the “combat mind-set.” Here is his summary:
[..]
In Yellow you bring yourself to the understanding that your life may be in danger and that you may have to do something about it.

Reading on, Schneier brings up the psychological toll that such a mindset can have, and that concept should not be new to anyone that has been in InfoSec for a few years.

Cooper talked about remaining in Code Yellow over time, but he didn’t write about its psychological toll. It’s significant. Our brains can’t be on that alert level constantly. We need downtime.

While not new a concept, this one flirts with another type of psychological toll that some in the industry are not familiar with, based on my conversations over the last year. It only took a few minutes of Twitter discussion for others to recognize the same thing. While the point I want to bring up is similar to a degree, I want to stress that is also significantly different based on profession. I am not comparing InfoSec people to the people that typically face this condition. That said, quoting Wikipedia’s entry on ‘Compassion Fatigue‘:

Compassion fatigue, also known as secondary traumatic stress (STS), is a condition characterized by a gradual lessening of compassion over time. It is common among individuals that work directly with trauma victims such as, therapists (paid and unpaid) nurses, psychologists, first responders, health unit coordinators and anyone who helps out others.

This is another important aspect for some InfoSec professionals, but clearly not all (or most?) of them. Personally, I feel this is a condition that can manifest in people who truly care about their work, and as the article says, people who “help out others”. Many in our industry technically help, to some degree, but are driven by profit and fame. I do not think they suffer from, or will ever suffer from such a condition. On the other hand, there are certainly many InfoSec professionals who strive to help their clients, the public, and anyone they can. Money is a nice perk, but they are likely the ones that would do it even if it meant a paltry salary. Unfortunately, I think that many of them are newer to the industry as it speaks directly to compassion fatigue and the effects it can have on an individual. From Wikipedia again:

Sufferers can exhibit several symptoms including hopelessness, a decrease in experiences of pleasure, constant stress and anxiety, sleeplessness or nightmares, and a pervasive negative attitude. This can have detrimental effects on individuals, both professionally and personally, including a decrease in productivity, the inability to focus, and the development of new feelings of incompetency and self-doubt.

First, I don’t think our industry suffers from the last detrimental effect. It is brimming with egotistical idiots that never have those feelings, even if they should. Second, while I doubt anyone in our industry will suffer nightmares, the rest can and likely hold true to varying degrees. More specifically, hopelessness and a negative attitude. I will be the first to admit that I fall into this category when it comes to InfoSec. I have a serious level of apathy and disillusionment with the effectiveness of our industry. I have several draft blog posts on this topic and may finish one some day. All of the evidence is right there, showing we fail over and over in the bigger picture. Those who argue otherwise are idealists or new to the industry. Either they haven’t seen the evidence, or they refuse to believe it. It is easy to miss when you live the life. But there is a steady level of ‘systematic desensitization’ as @VRHax calls it, and that is spot on. For anecdotal comparison, think back to the frog in boiling water story, even if not true. It happens to us all, even if we aren’t fully cognizant of it.

While compassion fatigue can have a much more serious toll on some of the professions listed above, I believe that it likely has an interesting way to manifest for our industry. Rather than lose the desire to help, or feel it is hopeless, I think that it slowly wears down an individual in a different way. They lose that desire to help out of a truly noble cause, and inch toward doing it only for the salary and lifestyle that many of us enjoy. As such, they become hopeless as far as original intent, don’t enjoy their work as much, develop a base level of stress, and grow an increasingly negative attitude, yet do it because it pays well.

Unfortunately, when you join the industry, you aren’t warned about this to any degree.

If you volunteer at an animal rescue / rehabilitation shop, you are likely to be warned of this during your orientation on day one. And for good reason! When you spend your time trying to help a sick or wounded animal, do everything in your power to help it, and it doesn’t make it… it is devastating. That warning is what prompted me to read more on the topic originally, and it took Schneier’s blog to make me realize just how true it was in our industry, one that largely helps out of selfish gain rather than altruistic desire. So I am grateful for his blog missing the mark as usual, but doing so in a way that prompted this blog and discussion. Is there a solution to this, for InfoSec professionals? Not that I can figure out. Many that see the problem still operate under this assumption that we can magically fix things, if only we could figure out! They rarely give merit to the possibility we are in an untenable position and there is no way to win. Perhaps they should watch Star Trek again and consider the value of the Kabayashi Maru challenge. In the mean time, I will offer you a simple but slightly twisted way to help deal with compassion fatigue in our industry; by going outside of it. Dare to face it in another world while you help others unrelated to technology. I’ve found great reward in doing it every week, even if I may ultimately face the same problem.

2015-06-07-151123-Chip20150712_154604

BSidesLV, two boxes-of-shit up for charity auction…

For those not familiar, last year I created a new-and-improved Box-of-Shit that was put for charity auction at BSidesLV 2014. Wow, lot of dashes there, go Engrish! For those not familiar with the absolutely legendary attrition.org boxes-of-shit, take a minute to familiarize yourself with it. The box last year was the center of a heated bidding war, with a BSidesLV security staff member proxying bids from another room, as a bidder was also teaching a class or robbing a casino or something like that. Anyway, Nate the Hero (official title) donated $1,000 to the charities selected by BSides (EFF, Securing Change, and HFC). Outstanding!

This year, I doubled down. There are TWO boxes of shit up for auction…

First, the important part. I humbly ask that you read and focus on this bit, because it is the entire point of my effort and goal in doing this. BSidesLV 2015 auctions will raise money for OWASP, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Hackers for Charity (HFC), and Hak4Kidz. Supporting charity is always a good thing, right?

Remember, InfoSec is considered a “zero unemployment” industry, and our average salaries are ridiculous. While we are quick to do the Facebook “like-activism” to support minimum wage increases, many of us spend $6 on a coffee every morning. If you make solid money in our field, and you cannot go out of pocket for 1% of your salary, you should probably skip the next version of “h4ck1ng f0r l33t kidz” and read a book on personal finances. Live a little… give up a shred of luxury, and donate to the greater good. If you win, you will get to read some personal thoughts I have on the matter, and receive a challenge of sorts.

So… there are two boxes this year! You can troll my Twitter feed for a few random pictures that barely tease what are in each. Even better, you can use this blog to see the teaser page that is accompanied with each box! I’ve been told that there will be remote bidding this year, which is very cool. For the next two days, I will also answer questions about each box, in a manner that does not reveal how awesome, or how lame a box is. Rest assured, more time and energy was spent on these two boxes than all other boxes/envelopes I have ever sent out, combined. Each box comes with a ~ 4 page personal letter for the winner, among other things. That has to be worth a postage stamp at the least.

box-bad

box-good

Here you go! You get what the in-person bidders get, the same teaser PDF. If you are at keys, you can play 20 questions via Twitter, while they are throwing back a bud light and telling their new friends about how they found an unpatched WordPress CMS last week.

p.s. These are likely to be the last ever boxes I brew, for many reasons.
p.p.s. In the interest of exposure, I will spam this link several times the next couple of days. DEAL WITH IT

John Thomas Draper: Setting the Record Straight

It is almost a ‘fact’ that John Draper, also known as Captain Crunch, discovered that a toy whistle in a box of cereal could be used to make free phone calls. I say ‘almost’ a fact, because so many people believe it, and so many people have written about it as if it were fact. Even recently, a magazine known for intelligent geeky facts parroted this falsehood:

Not long after Engressia shared this information with the other phreakers, John Draper discovered that a toy boatswain’s whistle that was included in boxes of Cap’n Crunch cereal in the late 1960s could blow a perfect 2600Hz tone.

Even going back to 1983, a book titled “Fighting Computer Crime” by Donn B. Parker carried the myth:

A young man just entering the U.S. Air Force to serve as a radio technician was fascinated with telephony and took courses on the subject at college and discovered the whistle that catapulted him to crime, infamy, and misfortune.

Google around for tales of Draper and the whistle will find a variety of sites that say he discovered it. These include the Snopes message board, a telephone tribute site, high school papers, and other archival sites. And this isn’t limited to more obscure sites, this ‘fact’ is still repeated by mainstream media articles.

While some in the industry have had doubts or heard tale that Draper did not discover the whistle’s significant tone, it wasn’t until last year that we finally got a definitive answer and story. Phil Lapsley wrote a book titled “Exploding the Phone” that gives an exhaustive history of phone phreaking and is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. Lapsley’s research put him in touch with many players of the time, and the real story emerged:

Page 155: Several years earlier a Los Angeles phone phreak named Sid Bernay had discovered you could generate a nice, clean 2,600 Hz tone simply by covering one of the holes in the plastic toy bosun whistle that was given away as a prize in boxes of Cap’n Crunch cereal. Armed with their Cap’n Crunch whistles Fettgather and Teresi and friends would cluster around pay phones at the airport and go nuts. [..] With Draper in the club the whistle trips expanded.

Page 166: (late summer of 1970) It was on one of those conference calls that John Draper discovered a new identity for himself. [..] One day Draper and Engressia were talking about using a Cap’n Crunch whistle to make their beloved 2,600 Hz tone, Engressia recalls, when Draper suddenly said, “You know, I think I’ll just call myself Captain Crunch. That’d be a good name.” Engressia immediately liked it. “It just fit him somehow,” he remembers. “It was just a good name for him. We called him ‘Captain’ a lot.” Captain Crunch was born.

Given that most of Draper’s modern reputation is based on his ‘discovery’ of the whistle, something he has done nothing to dispel or come clean about, I feel it is important to help set the record straight. While he may be an iconic figure in lore, even if undeserved, it is important to better understand what kind of person he was during this time.

Page 245: And as a rule universally agreed upon within their group, they avoided John Draper and his friends like the plague. “I tell you,” [David] Condon says, “Draper was the kiss of death. He was asking for it, he was looking for trouble.

Page 313: All this did not sit well with Steve Jobs and the other managers at Apple, who thought the Charley Board product was a bit too risky and, besides, they disliked Draper to begin with.

In addition to being disliked, Draper had a growing criminal record that included seven counts of violating 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by Wire, when he used a blue box to Australia, New York, and other places) in 1972, violating probation later in 1972, arrested in California in 1976, and indicted on three counts of 18 USC 1343 while on probation. To this day, Draper maintains it was a conspiracy:

Page 287: To this day, Draper maintains that he was framed. [..] “Well, it turns out that he had arranged with the FBI to tap that phone,” Draper says. “he told the FBI that I was going to be making a blue box call at that phone at that date and time.” The result was that the FBI now had a blue box call on tape with Draper’s voice on it. [..] You see, the informant that the Los Angeles office of the FBI sent up didn’t arrive in the Bay Area until Tuesday, February 24. The blue box telephone calls that Draper was eventually busted for occurred four days earlier, on Friday, February 20. And on that Friday the Los Angeles informant was still in Los Angeles, enjoying sunny southern California weather or breathing smog or whatever it is that LA phone phreak informants do when they’re off duty.

But this wasn’t the end of his crime. In New Jersey in 1977 he was arrested and charged with possession of a red box, which was later dropped. He was again arrested in 1977, this time in Pennsylvania, which led to him agreeing to a plea deal in 1978 to one count of possessing a device to steal telecom services. He was sentenced to 3 – 6 months in jail with credit for 1 month served. That charge and plea also meant he violated his federal probation for earlier crimes, sending him back to California to spend time in prison as well. During all of this time, two psychiatrists observed that Draper “tend[s] to pass himself off as the victim claiming that he has almost no control over all of the troubles that now beset him” and that he had “numerous paranoid delusions of being especially picked out for persecution because of his power and knowledge”. Both psychiatrists agreed that a jail would not be a good place for Draper, leading a judge to sentence him to a furlough program for one year. Finally, in 1987, he was caught forging tickets for the BART system which lead to a plea bargain, resulting in a misdemeanor.

I offer all of this up, courtesy of Exploding the Phone, as a reminder that many people in InfoSec consider him a hero of sorts, and feel that his history was beneficial to the world of phreaking. In reality, it was not. He was just another phreak at the time, did not discover the Cap’n Crunch whistle, was caught during his crimes several times, and then somehow became a telecom legend. To this day, Draper still tries to use his reputation to get handouts from the industry. If you want to support him, just be sure you understand who you are supporting, and why.

Anatomy of a NYT Piece on the Sony Hack and Attribution

There is a lot of back-and-forth over who hacked Sony Pictures Entertainment. For a not-so-brief summary, here is an extensive timeline to catch you up. I am going to drill down on a single point as it is both fascinating and disgusting. Using a single article that is heavily influencing people around the world, and helping to polarize the InfoSec community on who hacked Sony, I want to show you exactly what you are quoting and reading. Why? Because people don’t seem to be reading past the headline or first couple of paragraphs. What seems like a strong, definitive piece, falls apart and begins to contradict itself entirely halfway through the article. The New York Times piece in question is titled “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony“.

Consider what the headline says. First, it says that North Korea ordered the attack on Sony. Second, it says the U.S. has found out, meaning there is some body of evidence that led to that conclusion. Seems simple enough. But where does this come from?

American officials have concluded that North Korea was “centrally involved” …
Senior administration officials, who would not speak on the record …
Officials said it was not clear how the White House would respond.
Other administration officials said a direct confrontation with the North would provide North Korea with the kind of dispute it covets.

So how many officials are we talking about here? American officials? Senior administration officials? “Other” administration officials? Not a single one on record, which is very curious given named sources are the backbone of solid reporting. Are these officials part of the military? Law enforcement agency? Or just policy wonks that may or may not be getting briefed by someone with a clue?

The administration’s sudden urgency came after a new threat was delivered this week to desktop computers at Sony’s offices, warning that if “The Interview” was released on Dec. 25, “the world will be full of fear.”

Wait, so the Sony network is still entirely compromised weeks after it was publicly disclosed? That is an interesting angle, why haven’t we seen articles covering that? The company brought in to do forensics, are they losing this battle? Or did they mean the message was emailed to Sony employees, and the wording is confusing since the initial attack included actually replacing the desktop background on thousands of Sony desktops? Or was this a reference to the attackers posting that message on a public website (Pastebin)?

“Remember the 11th of September 2001,” it said. “We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at that time.”

This comes from the latest Pastebin post, since removed. I think that is the simple, logical explanation.

While intelligence officials have concluded that the cyberattack was both state-sponsored and far more destructive than any seen before on American soil, there are still differences of opinion over whether North Korea was aided by Sony insiders with knowledge of the company’s computer systems, senior administration officials said.

Wait a minute, the title is definitive, the U.S. says North Korea did it. Now even more unnamed officials say Sony insiders may have helped them? If you follow the whole “this is an act of war” nonsense, then any American Sony employee just committed treason, right? If it was a Japanese Sony employee, then Japan is in league with North Korea? I mean, we have to be careful on our rhetoric of war and blame, as these little comments can mean big things.

North Korea’s computer network has been notoriously difficult to infiltrate. But the National Security Agency began a major effort four years ago to penetrate the country’s computer operations, including its elite cyberteam, and to establish “implants” in the country’s networks that, like a radar system, would monitor the development of malware transmitted from the country.

So Newt Gingrich, Dave Aitel, and others are saying a North Korean attack on Japanese company Sony is an “act of war” against the U.S., but we openly admit that the U.S. government has been trying to penetrate North Korean computers for at least four years, and that isn’t an act of war? That doesn’t make sense. Either such intrusions are an act of war, or they aren’t. We can’t have this both ways.

It is hardly a foolproof system. Much of North Korea’s hacking is done from China. And while the attack on Sony used some commonly available cybertools, one intelligence official said, “this was of a sophistication that a year ago we would have said was beyond the North’s capabilities.”

So the definitive headline is now clouded by statements like these. We don’t know where the attacks originated, the tools were commonly available and had been seen in attacks years ago, but then the official says it is sophisticated? Not sure this ‘intelligence official’ has the same standards for the word ‘sophisticated’ as many in InfoSec.

But there is a long forensic trail involving the Sony hacking, several security researchers said. The attackers used readily available commercial tools to wipe data off Sony’s machines. They also borrowed tools and techniques that had been used in at least two previous attacks, one in Saudi Arabia two years ago — widely attributed to Iran — and another last year in South Korea aimed at banks and media companies.

Do we all know what a forensic trail is? This is a shaky list of circumstantial evidence at best. Given the use and history of the tools, making an assumption on who used it seems absurd.

But one of those servers, in Bolivia, had been used in limited cyberattacks on South Korean targets two years ago. That suggested that the same group or individuals might have been behind the Sony attack.

Again, do we not see how circumstantial this is? On one hand you claim the attackers are sophisticated, on the other you say they use a compromised computer for two years that would implicate them because of past attacks.

The Sony malware shares remarkable similarities with that used in attacks on South Korean banks and broadcasters last year. Those intrusions, which also destroyed data belonging to their victims, are believed to have been the work of a cybercriminal gang known as Dark Seoul. Some experts say they cannot rule out the possibility that the Sony attack was the work of a Dark Seoul copycat, the security researchers said.

Definitive headline, yet more doubt on who attacked Sony.

The Sony attack also borrowed a wiping tool from an attack two years ago at Saudi Aramco, the national oil company, where hackers wiped off data on 30,000 of the company’s computers, replacing it with an image of a burning American flag.

A public tool from two years ago, and this is influencing attribution? Investigators should be logical and skeptical. Actual evidence should be the guiding factor in their investigation and determining attribution.

Security experts were never able to track down those hackers, though United States officials have long said they believed the attacks emanated from Iran, using tools that are now on the black market.

So we couldn’t positively attribute the attack two years ago that used those tools, and now we want to use that tenuous link claiming it is some kind of ‘proof’ North Korea was involved? This makes no sense.

“It’s clear that they already had access to Sony’s network before the attack,” said Jaime Blasco, a researcher at AlienVault, a cybersecurity consulting firm.

I have given many a buzz-quote to the media, and I understand how they can be taken out of context. This is a great example. Blasco sounds like a total idiot, but I have a strong feeling he isn’t. What does this quote mean exactly? Getting access to Sony’s network requires an attack. Subsequent actions are part of that attack, or the fallout. Or does he mean “had access” in the context of a legitimate trusted employee? InfoSec people: be careful when giving buzz-quotes to journalists.

The cost of the assault was small: The attackers used readily available tools to steal data and then wipe it off Sony’s machines.

Once again, “readily available tools”, yet we are attributing this to a nation-state attack? Read between the lines and we have no real attribution at this point, at least not demonstrated by anyone. I doubt Mandiant is sharing their results with anyone publicly, leaving the rest of this to guess-work.

Representative Mike Rogers, the Michigan Republican who leads the House Intelligence Committee, said the hackers had “created a backdoor to Sony’s systems” that they repeatedly re-entered to send threatening messages to Sony employees.

Ya think? That is hacker 101 shit right there Mr. Rogers. Sophisticated malware to allow such access has been around for more than 30 years, and is trivial to get from thousands of web sites.

The North Koreans have half-denied involvement, but have left open the possibility that the attacks were the “righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers.”

Well played North Korea.

All in all, we have an article with a definitive title, “citing” between one and dozens of unnamed officials, that may be guessing like most of the world, giving as much “evidence” that it wasn’t necessarily North Korea, and it is whipping up a frenzy causing politicians and InfoSec professionals calling this war. I’ve said it for a week, and I must say it again. How about we wait for actual evidence. A public report outlining all of the forensics available, that can be peer-reviewed to some capacity, before we go rattling our saber at a country that may not be involved. Sure, North Korea is wonky on their statements implying it was them, then “half-denying” it, whatever that means (curious no one ever links to these statements, or are these more “unnamed officials” from their government?).

Remember, North Korea is the same country that threatened the U.S. with a nuclear missile earlier this year. They like to rattle their saber at everyone, but it doesn’t mean they actually did anything. Taking their implications or half-denials as fact isn’t prudent. I am not saying North Korea wasn’t involved. I am simply saying that this speculative circle-jerk is not helping anyone, and only serves to cause headache and grief. Level-heads must prevail. If you feel the need to comment on the matter, make sure you are educated about what has happened the last 30 days, and then try to be a voice of reason in this ugly mess.

e-MDs, Inc. Solution Series 7.2.1.634 Screen Lock Failure Information Disclosure

e-MDs, Inc. Solution Series integrated electronic health record and practice management software version 7.2.1.634 contains a flaw in the screen lock functionality. When a user locks the screen, under some circumstances, the screen will display the login box but fail to obscure any of the information displayed otherwise. As I discovered on March 21, 2014 at my doctor’s office, the screen not only displayed some of my information including name, account number, date of birth, phone number, and doctor notes, it also showed the same information for a second patient.

emds-solutions

BSidesLV, Charity, and a change of heart.

Read it all heathen! Teaser list of stuff in the charity box is included below.

As most reading this blog know, next week is the annual pilgrimage to Las Vegas to attend the ‘meta-con’. A mix of BSidesLV, BlackHat Briefings USA, DEFCON, and a number of other smaller sub-conferences, meet-ups, gatherings, and the ever present ‘hallway-con’. It is a week of chaos. Incredible opportunity always clashes with regrets, wishing you had checked out a talk, or met up with long-time friends, or run into new people you only know virtually. My first DEFCON was #2, twenty years ago, and it seems like both yesterday and a lifetime ago. I won’t go into a long analysis on how it is changed; just know it has changed drastically. Not saying for the better or worse either, because it is both.

Next week I am putting up an infamous attrition.org box-of-shit for charity at BSidesLV. I have done charity boxes at BSidesDEN in 2012 and 2014 that raised around $480 for the supported charities (usually EFF and/or HFC). Those were in addition to other charity auctions via eBay to support the Open Security Foundation, EFF, and the Concoctory.

You may notice a trend here. The last few years, I have made a big change to help support charities/NFP a lot more than I did before, including volunteering time as I can. Next week I will be working the registration desk at BSidesLV, and working as a volunteer for the Skytalks at DEFCON. Unrelated to security, I donate a fair amount of money and/or time to animal-related charities around the Denver area. I support a variety of humanitarian efforts to support research to cure ailments, fight hunger, and more.

Now, I want to do more, and I want more security professionals to do the same. As an industry, we make a ridiculous amount of money providing security services. As an industry, we fail miserably at doing so. Sure, we have our individual wins here and there chasing contracts. But as a whole? Digital security is at an all-time low. There is more computer crime, more breaches, published vulnerabilities are not dropping despite incentive not to disclose (if you even quote CVE and a ‘drop’ to me, get out of my industry), and a more fundamental lack of trust in anything related to computers. If we’re making stupid money providing inferior services while towing a favorable line, we need to look inward and re-examine our lives. It simply isn’t ethical to reap the rewards on the back of false promises. As an industry, we need to strive to do better (and we have proven we can’t), or start to give back to more worthwhile efforts.

I encourage you to consider this seriously. Look at how you can give back to the community in more ways than you are currently doing. Figure out more causes that could benefit from your time or financial support. Break away from the corporate high-dollar conferences run by non-security companies and support the home-grown community-driven conferences. Keep that in mind and bid generously on my two auctions.


box-teaser

Next week at BSidesLV, on Tuesday and Wednesday, you can participate in the silent charity auction and bid on this box-of-shit. Unlike previous boxes, I have worked to ensure this one is different, more interesting, and more valuable (which is subjective, I know). First, it has a limited edition attrition.org DEFCON 22 badge in the box. Only five were made this year! One is up for auction by itself right now, and it sets the stage for the box. Next, there is a hand-knit Lazlo hat made by J. Renee Worsing that comes with care instructions. Not only is the badge made by Make It Urz, there is an engraved Lazlo lapel pin in the box.

If you win this box, you are fully encouraged to embrace that badge. Walk around all of the conferences telling wild tales of your work with attrition.org. Spin stories about the other staff members, what you have endured, what para-military ops you have done on our behalf. This badge gives you creative license to social engineer anyone and everyone you meet. Flash that badge and you have a 0.3% chance of walking into any other party. Flash that badge at the 303 party and I will personally escort you in, even if the party isn’t open to the masses yet. Find me in a random bar, I will buy you a drink or three. ALL WEEK.

That is the tip of the iceberg! In addition to those fine items, the following is contained in the box. And yes, my wording is carefully chosen to keep you guessing, while being entirely accurate at the same time.

  • Collectible currency from 8 different countries.
  • A military challenge coin.
  • Certified piece of history circa 1989.
  • Original ‘FREE KEVIN’ bumper sticker.
  • Attrition.org bracelets.
  • A gift card. For a store, some amount more than a dollar.
  • DEFCOn 21 speaker badge.
  • Lockpicks.
  • A “pocket full of fun”. Make of that what you will.
  • Cold, hard cash.
  • Stickers, items from a jail, and “sparkle power”.

All of that is in addition to the usual box-of-shit stuff that is more questionable in value. This box was designed for fun, for you to enjoy as you open it up and dig through the contents. Nikita contributed a lot of the material found in this box, so you should buy her a booze next week. Not so much for the box, more for the amount of time, effort, and anguish she puts into making DEFCON happen. It isn’t entirely the ‘Jeff show’.

Remember that your money is going to worthwhile charities that help other people. None of this money goes to me. It will go to a fund that is divided up to support EFF, HFC, and Securing Change.

20140802_164721

Samsung Galaxy Phones Factory Reset Persistent Local Information Disclosure

A couple years back, I handed my Samsung Galaxy S1 down to a friend. When she got it she browsed the file system out of curiosity and noticed that it had retained private information; both from applications, as well as content I generated (e.g. pictures). While she promised to do a write-up of all the information left behind, she never did (flake!). This is obviously a problem for those who reset their phone thinking it is truly wiped clean, and then hand it off to a friend, sell it, or trade it in for credit.

The other day, a relative and I both upgraded our phones. Him from a Galaxy S2 to a S5, and me from a Galaxy S3 to a S5. So I figured why not check both out to see if they did the same. Cliff notes: The Samsung Galaxy S2 (model SGH-T989) ‘factory reset’ leaves a lot of personal information behind, while the Samsung Galaxy S3 (model SGH-T999) does not. It certainly does not delete your content.

Here is what I found left behind on the Galaxy S2. Directories for installed applications that did not get deleted, or deleted entirely:
\CamScanner
\foursquare
\gameloft
\Intsig
\Lazylist
\telenav
\data\flixster
\convertpad

files:
\telenav70\sdlogs\4\22\2014042208.txt
\telenav70\sdlogs\5\23\2014052320.txt
\Photo Editor\2014-03-30 19.11.22.jpg
(personal picture)
\lookout\log.txt
\Intsig\CamScanner\.log\log-2013-12-25_21-59-09.log
\DCIM\Camera
(55 personal pictures)
\contactBackup\contacts.csv
\contactBackup\contacts.pdf
(both contain full list of contacts: name and phone #. this is from an app that backed up contact info)
\Android\data\com.zynga.words\cache\FBImages
(three images, FB avatar pics of players)
\Android\data\com.facebook.katana\cache\.facebook_-372648771.jpg
(private image from FB)
\tmp_fsquare.jpg
\tmp_fsq
(a PNG thumbnail of avatar selected for the app)
tmp_fsquare

The Galaxy S3 (model SGH-T999) that I used pretty heavily, was much better after factory reset. I found the following left behind:

\Phone\Application\SMemo
(didn’t use this app despite installing it. files suggests private info may be available after reset)

All pictures, contact info, and information from applications is gone. So from the Galaxy S1 to the Galaxy S3, Samsung figured out the ‘Factory Wipe’ finally.

Screenshot_2014-07-03-20-26-56